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Abstract 
Previous literature has documented but not yet explained asymmetric exchange rate responses 
to unanticipated inflation announcements under a credible inflation-targeting regime. We 
present a theoretical model explaining the reported asymmetries in exchange-rate responses 
based on asymmetries in monetary policy preferences.  
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1. Introduction  
Existing studies have documented that announcements on the values of leading macro-
indicators are followed by significant exchange rate impact responses (for a survey see Neely, 
2010). The exchange rate effects of inflation announcements, in particular, have received 
extensive attention with previous research having established two stylised facts:  
First, when positive (negative) inflation surprises occur, i.e. when actual inflation is 
announced to have exceeded (fall below) its expected value, the impact effect for the domestic 
currency is often to appreciate (depreciate) (see Clarida and Waldman, 2008 and Conrad and 
Lamla, 2010). This response goes against the predictions of the textbook Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) hypothesis under which increasing (decreasing) inflation rates cause currency 
depreciation (appreciation). This, at first sight paradoxical, exchange rate behaviour has been 
convincingly explained on the basis of a credible inflation-targeting monetary policy: If 
expectations are well-anchored to a credible inflation target, positive (negative) inflation 
surprises trigger increases (reductions) in short-term domestic interest rates leading to 
increased (reduced) real returns on the domestic currency (see Neely, 2010). These, in turn, 
cause increased (reduced) demand for domestic currency leading to its appreciation 
(depreciation).  
The second stylised fact is that the relationship described above is not linear but subject to 
sign-effects: The depreciations following announcements of inflation rates lower than expected 
are larger in absolute size, and of stronger statistical significance, than the appreciations 
following announcements of inflation rates higher than expected (see Clarida and Weldman, 
2008). So far no theoretical justification has been provided for this second stylised fact. This 
paper presents such a theoretical explanation. To foreshadow what follows, like the explanation 
of the first stylised fact, our explanation is based on monetary policy considerations and, in 
particular, asymmetric monetary policy preferences. 
2. Theoretical framework  
In this section, we lay out a simple theoretical framework demonstrating that asymmetric 
exchange rate responses can occur as long as the monetary authority weights the downside of 
the economy more than the upside. A widely-cited theoretical model allowing asymmetric 
policy preferences between positive and negative deviations from output and inflation targets 
has been provided by Surico (2007a). His analysis is motivated on two grounds. First, public 
statements by highly-ranked officials, including Alan Blinder, the ex-vice-chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, according to which “central banks will take far 
more political heat when it tightens [monetary policy] pre-emptively to avoid higher inflation 
than when it eases pre-emptively to avoid higher unemployment” (Blinder, 1998, p. 19-20).  
Moreover, theoretical models exploring various sources causing state-dependent business cycle 
costs predict more aggressive monetary policy responses during periods of economic 
slowdowns rather than expansions [among others, see Kahneman and Tyrersky (1979) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1999)].1 Empirical evidence confirming the existence of asymmetric 
monetary policy responses to different phases of the business cycle has been provided by 
numerous studies, including Ruge-Murcia (2003), Surico (2007a,b) and Cuckierman and 
Muscatelli (2008).  
The model by Surico (2007a) refers to a closed economy and, as such, does not capture the 
effects of asymmetric monetary policy preferences on exchange rate behaviour. Therefore, it 
                                                          1 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that the psychology of choice reveals that agents deciding under 
uncertainty attach higher weights on the probability of losses rather than gains. This suggests that policy makers 
who aggregate over individual welfare follow loss-averse policy rules. Persson and Tabellini (1999) show that 
retrospective voting combined with imperfect competition about the incumbent’s talent results into politicians 
imposing on central banks asymmetric policy objectives involving more aggressive monetary policy responses 
during economic downturns. 
 
cannot explain the asymmetric response of exchange rates to inflation announcements stated 
in the introduction section. We present an open economy model in which asymmetric policy 
preferences cause not only asymmetric responses of nominal interest rates (as it is the case in 
Surico’s analysis) but, also asymmetric responses of exchange rates. We denote output gap by 
ݕ௧ = ௧ܻ − ௧ܻഥ , where, respectively, ௧ܻ and ௧ܻഥ  are the logs of real gross domestic product (GDP) 
and potential real GDP. The inflation rate, ߨ௧, is defined as the percent change in the aggregate 
price level between periods t-1 and t. We borrow from the new Keynesian framework surveyed 
in Clarida et al. (1999) where the output gap and the inflation rate are expressed in terms of an 
IS curve and a Phillips curve. We adopt an IS equation which following Clarida and Weldman 
(2008), is augmented with the nominal exchange rate as follows: 
                                    ݕ௧ = −߶ሾ݅௧ − ߨ௧ାଵ௘ ሿ + ߠܵ௧ + ݕ௧ାଵ௘ + ߝ௧                               (1) 
where ݅௧ is the nominal interest rate, ܵ௧ the nominal exchange rate (increasing values denote 
depreciation), ߝ௧ an innovation to the output gap, ߶ > 0, ߠ > 0 and superscript e denotes the 
expectation of a variable. Following Clarida et al. (1999), the Phillips equation is written as:  
                                         ߨ௧ = ߣݕ௧ + ߚߨ௧ାଵ௘ + ߟ௧                                                            (2)                                                                                                
where λ > 0, β > 0 and ηt is an innovation to the inflation rate. Finally, we assume uncovered 
interest rate parity given by: 
                                       (1 + ݅௧) = ௌ೟శభ೐ௌ೟ (1 + ݅௧௙)                                                             (3) 
where ݅௧௙ denotes the foreign interest rate.2 Following Surico (2007a) the monetary authority 
chooses the interest rate that minimizes the loss function, L: 
                            ܮ = ௘ഀ(ഏ೟షഏ∗)ିఈ(గ೟ିగ∗)ିଵఈమ + ߜ ቂ௘ം೤೟ିఊ௬೟ିଵఊమ ቃ + ఓଶ (݅௧ − ݅∗)ଶ                      (4) 
                                                          2 ߨ௧ାଵ௘ is assumed constant due to inflation-target credibility. ௧ܵାଵ௘  is also constant due to ߨ௧ାଵ௘  being constant. 
where π* and i* denote the inflation target and the interest rate target, respectively. Parameters 
δ and μ capture the aversion of the monetary authority toward output and interest rate 
fluctuations while parameters α and γ capture asymmetries in the response of the monetary 
authority to deviations of the inflation rate and the output gap rate from their targets. For 
negative values of  the monetary authority, when setting the interest rate, assigns higher 
weights to levels of the inflation rate below the target level. Likewise, for negative values of γ, 
the monetary authority weights more the downside of the economy (i.e. negative output gaps). 
In other words, for negative values of α and γ, the monetary authority perceives the costs of the 
business cycles as asymmetric by assigning relatively higher weights to low values of the 
inflation rate and the output gap. As pointed out by Surico (2007a), reduced-form estimates of 
post-war US policy rules indicate that the preferences of the Federal Reserve have been highly 
asymmetric with respect to both inflation and output gaps, with the latter being the dominant 
source of nonlinearity after 1983. Similar evidence is presented by Surico (2007b) for monetary 
policy in the euro area where output contractions are found to trigger larger policy responses 
than output expansions of the same size.  
The monetary authority minimizes  in (4) subject to (1), (2) and (3). The first-order 
condition reads:  
                                     ቂ߶ + ߠ ቀ ௌ೟ଵା௜೟ቁቃ ܼ௧ = ߤ(݅௧ − ݅∗)                                          (5)       
where, 
ܼ௧ = ߣ ݁ఈ
(గ೟ିగ∗) − 1
ߙ + ߜ
݁ఊ௬೟ − 1
ߛ  
To show the asymmetry in the exchange-rate response caused by the preference 
asymmetry in the monetary policy reaction function, we consider a calibrated version of our 
model where we set the inflation rate and interest rate targets to 2 and 4 percent, respectively. 

L
The expected exchange rate is normalized to unity and the foreign interest rate is set equal to 4 
percent. There is no strong prior information about the values of parameters α  and γ so they 
are both set equal to -0.5, consistent with some estimates reported in Surico (2007a). The values 
of the rest of the parameters are chosen as follows: μ = δ = 1, λ = 0.3, β = 0.5, ߶ = 0.5 and 
ߠ = 0.1 (results for alternative parameter values are discussed further below). For simplicity, 
we assume that fluctuations are driven either by innovations in the output gap (t) or in the 
inflation rate (t). In our example we set t = 0. Note that for fixed expectations for the inflation 
rate, the actual inflation rate is analogous to the output gap. That is, when the output gap is 
negative, the inflation rate is relatively low, whereas when the output gap is positive, the 
inflation rate is relatively high.  
Figure 1 displays the calibrated responses of the interest rate and the exchange rate to 
different levels of the output gap (the numbers are expressed in percentages). Specifically, it 
displays a simple case where exchange rate behaviour exhibits the exchange-rate response 
asymmetry observed in the data, as long as the monetary authority has asymmetric preferences 
according to which the downside of the economy is weighted more than the upside. The figure 
shows that when the economy is performing above its potential level (i.e. positive output gaps, 
depicted to the right-hand side of y = 0 on the horizontal axis), the monetary authority increases 
the interest rate in response to an increasing output gap but in a diminishing fashion. In other 
words, the response of the interest rate is less aggressive for higher levels of the output gap. 
This result is consistent with a scenario where the positive output gap triggers an inflation 
announcement of higher inflation, which in turn leads to an increase in the nominal interest 
rate. In that case, it follows from uncovered interest rate parity that interest rate increases lead 
to moderate appreciations of the exchange rate for higher levels of the output gap. Equivalently, 
when the economy experiences high inflation rates, there are moderate appreciations of the 
exchange rate. Notice that for high levels of the output gap (or high inflation rates) the exchange 
rate response becomes almost flat following the upward response of the interest rate, which is 
consistent with the appreciation’s low empirical statistical significance.  
INSERT FIGURE 1  
The opposite occurs when the economy experiences recessionary output gaps (negative 
output gaps, depicted to the left-hand side of y = 0 on the horizontal axis). Under these 
conditions, the monetary authority decreases drastically the interest rate as the recession 
deepens. This result is consistent with a scenario where the negative output gap triggers an 
inflation announcement of lower inflation, which in turn leads to a reduction in the interest rate. 
The result of the aggressive interest-rate reduction is that the economy experiences large and 
increasing depreciations of its currency, consistent with the depreciation’s strong empirical 
statistical significance. Equivalently, when the economy experiences low inflation, there are 
significant depreciations of the exchange rate. It is thus demonstrated that, under certain 
conditions, asymmetric monetary policy preferences may lead to asymmetric exchange rate 
responses consistent with the empirical patterns outlined in the introduction.  
 Our calibration analysis suggests that the asymmetry of the exchange rate displayed in 
Figure 1 is robust to values of α and γ much smaller or slightly larger than -0.5.3 In addition, 
the asymmetry is generated even when only one of α or γ is negative (see Surico, 2007b). 
However, if γ > 0 and α < 0 , the absolute value of α  must be relatively larger than the value 
of γ to generate the form of asymmetry displayed in Figure 1. Figure 2 displays the calibrated 
responses of the interest rate and the exchange rate for ߙ = −1.3 and ߛ = 0.5. Figure 3 
demonstrates that the form of asymmetry displayed in Figure 1 is preserved even when the 
value of α is changed to a relatively large positive value (in this case to 1.3). Overall, figures 2 
                                                          3 For example, for ߙ = ߛ > 0.7, the responses in the region where ݕ < 0 become less smooth. 
and 3, suggest that the role of the size of parameter γ is more important than that of parameter 
α in generating the type of exchange rate asymmetry observed in the data.  
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3  
Note that instead of the output gap we could have had the inflation rate on the horizontal 
axis of figures 1-3. The asymmetric exchange rate response is robust for values of θ, ߶, δ and 
λ less than and slightly greater than 0.1, 0.5, 1 and 0.3, respectively. Although the magnitude 
of the responses changes, the underlying asymmetry of the exchange rate is unaffected across 
any value of β. Finally, the main result is robust to different values of μ, as long as they are not 
smaller than 0.7; when μ < 0.7, the responses become less smooth.  
 
3. Summary  
Empirical studies have established that countries operating a credible inflation-targeting 
monetary policy experience asymmetric exchange rate responses under inflation surprises of 
equal magnitude but opposite sign. This paper provided a theoretical explanation of this 
previously unexplained stylised fact based on asymmetric monetary policy preferences. The 
intuition underlying our model is that if monetary authorities have larger aversion to negative 
rather than positive output gap values (and/or to inflation rates below the target level), as 
suggested by a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on asymmetric monetary policy 
preferences, they will stand ready to reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively when 
nominal interest rates must be reduced to meet a credible inflation target rather than to increase 
them when interest rates need to be increased to meet the same inflation target. Rational 
markets anticipating the difference in the speed of adjustment of nominal interest rates, and by 
extension real returns, will then stand ready to sell higher volumes of the domestic currency 
under negative inflation surprises rather than the volumes they will be willing to buy under 
positive ones. This difference causes asymmetric exchange rate responses to inflation surprises 
of equal magnitude but opposite sign.  
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Figure 1: The response of the interest rate and the exchange rate to  
different levels of the output gap (ߙ = ߛ = −0.5) 
 
Figure 2: The response of the interest rate and the exchange rate to  
different levels of the output gap (ߙ = −1.3 , ߛ = 0.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The response of the interest rate and the exchange rate to  
different levels of the output gap (ߙ = 1.3, ߛ = −0.5) 
 
 
     
